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Abstract
Does health diﬀerences between the US and France come from unemployment
risk gaps? A general equilibrium model à la Aiyagari (1994) augmented by invest-
ments in health à la Grossman (1972) is used to analyze the market allocations of
two particular economies: the US and France. The US are characterized by low un-
employment risk, associated to low unemployment insurance. The turnover in the
US is larger than in France. We show that expenditures in health are strongly related
to the labor market turnover leading the American to perceived their employment
spells as a more risky events, therefore reducing their incentives to invest in health.
This contributes to explain the poorer health of the Americans than French.
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1 Introduction
During recent years, the health inequalities have become more and more a severe
issue around the globe. In developed countries, one dimension of these inequality is the
diﬀerence of health status between employees and unemployed workers. In the US, the
percentage of poor health agents among workers is about 8.2%, but it's basically doubled
among agents who experience less than one year unemployed duration but even tripped
among agents who experience longer than one year unemployed duration (see Meyer et
al. (2013) [13]). Despite its generous social security system, France must also deal with
health inequalities. At a 35 years old, the life expectancy of unemployed male is 28.5
years, while it rises to 40 years for an employee (see Potvin et al. (2010)[14]). In this
paper, we explain these health inequalities using a general equilibrium model à la Aiyagari
(1994)[1] augmented by investments in health à la Grossman (1972)[9]. Our goal is to
understand the interactions between choices of health expenditures and unemployment
risk, in a framework rich enough to account for the major diﬀerences between the United
States and France to explain health status diﬀerences.
We develop an original extension of the Aiyagari's model where, besides the labor
income risk, an uncertainty on the health status is introduced. The health choices are
discrete as in search models of the labor market where multiple oﬀers are available1: agents
decide to consume or not a ﬁx amount in health services. This leads only individuals in bad
health to invest in health. The investment in health only gives a better chance to restore
the health status: it is a risky project. In this risky environment, agents can save to insure
themselves against these bad shocks (unemployment and disease). Hence, our approach
accounts for the interaction between assets accumulation and investment in health. In this
dynamic and stochastic framework, the complete history of the agents on the labor market
determines wealth distribution and thus the heterogenous ﬁnancial capacities to invest in
health: the health inequalities are an endogenous output of the model solution. This is
a crucial point because survey reports that 15.8% of individuals declare that they give
1These discrete choices are closed to those of a search models of the labor market where multiple oﬀers
are available; see e.g. Algan, Hairault, Langot and Chéron (2003) [2].
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up spending on health for ﬁnancial reasons (see Dourgnon et al (2012)[5] based on ESPS
survey). Additional empirical evidences show that health inequalities is not only caused by
labor market status or dangerous habits (alcohol addictive, heavy smoker,etc.), but also
by several barriers such as information barriers, or culture barriers, and most importantly,
ﬁnancial barriers (see Jusot (2010)[11]).2 In order to examine contrasting experiences and
thereby check the robustness of our model, we use it to study two countries: the US
where the unemployment insurance is limited in the context of low unemployment risk
and high turnover, but where the cost of health expenditures is large, and France where
the unemployment beneﬁt system is more generous in the context of high unemployment
risk and low turnover, but where the price of the health services are low.3
In general equilibrium model, the health risk leads to health expenditures that can
reduce through a crowding-out eﬀect the amount of saving. But the health risk is also a
motive of precautionary saving. These two opposites eﬀects drive the changes in saving
and thus the capital available for the production, and thus the output. Moreover, the
risks on the labor market have a direct impact on the output via the employment level,
but also provide incentives for self-insurance, and thus aﬀect the output via the capital
stock. Our general equilibrium model accounts for these complex interactions. Numeral
resolutions based on calibration of both countries allow us to determine which are the
dominant forces at work. Our ﬁrst result come from the calibration restrictions: if we
want to match a larger share of health expenditures in GDP in the US than in France
but, at the same time, a smaller percentage of individuals in good health in the US than
in France, we must introduce heterogenous parameters for the health sector, in addition
to heterogenous labor market characteristics. Hence, as in Fonseca, Langot, Michaud and
Sopraseuth (2018)[6], it is necessary to introduce a higher price of the health services in
the US as well as a lower value of a healthy life (More frequent health risky behaviors in
the US). We also show that the productivity of the health sector must be higher in the
2For simplicity and as in De Nardi, French and Jones (2016)[4] or in Fonseca, Langot, Michaud and
Sopraseuth (2018)[6], we assume that the beneﬁce of being healthy is directly added in the utility function.
We do not introduce bonus in wage when individual are in the good health state, because the impact of
this channel is negligible. See Eric French (2005)[7].
3Given that the health investment is a ﬁxed cost, the generosity of the health insurance system is
simply revealed by the gap between the values of these ﬁx costs among countries.
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US than in France in order to match our set targeted moments. Secondly, counterfactual
experiments shows that all the characteristic of the US labor market (low unemployment
beneﬁt and high turnover) contributes signiﬁcantly to the poor heath of the Americans.
Nevertheless, we also show that the indirect impact of the labor market status on health
status have a lower impact on crosscountry diﬀerences than the structure of the health
market (price, productivity and risky behaviors).
There already exists a literature that analyze the health choices using general equi-
librium model with heterogenous agents. French(2003)[8] reveal a signiﬁcant catastrophic
health costs risk: in any given year, 0.1% of households suﬀer a shock that costs at least
125,000 dollars over their lifetime. De Nardi(2009)[3] build a model that aims to explores
the diﬀerent saving behaviors upon retirement of diﬀerent Social-Economic Status when
facing various health risks. This paper shows that (i) the risk of living beyond the expected
life span, explains the very slow assets de-cumulation rate of the elderly after retirement,
and (ii) the medical costs is another important determinant to the assets de-cumulation
rate of the elderly. But these works mainly focus on the elderly. One exception is Fonseca,
Langot, Michaud and Sopraseuth (2018)[6] that focus on the health risks for all individu-
als and also compare the market allocations for a large set of OECD countries. Fonseca,
Langot, Michaud and Sopraseuth (2018)[6] show that the cross-country diﬀerences in the
price of health services are the main explaining factor allowing them to explain simultane-
ously the gaps in health status and in health expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the
OECD countries of their sample. Nevertheless these authors deals with the labor market
risk as an income risk without distinguishing between employment and unemployment.
In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model that allows us to analyze the health risks
for all the population, with a particular focus on its interaction with the unemployment
risk on the labor market.
The organization of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we present the theoretical
model and the algorithm, in section 3 we discuss the method we use to calibrate diﬀerent
parameters, especially the ones related to the health risk. Then we present the results,
alongside with their interpretations and intuitions.
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2 The theoretical model
Individual agents. The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived house-
holds and the total population is normalized to 1. At the beginning of the current period,
a household earns an amount of wealth denoted by a. The household is characterized by
an employment status and an health status. Let denote by j the employment status. The
household may be employed (j = e) or unemployed (j = u). The health status is denoted
by h. The household may be in good health (h = g) or in bad health (h = b). To sum up,
at the present time, an agent is characterized by a vector of three state variables (a, j, h).
Job and health status evolve following Markov processes. The process describing the
evolution of the job status is exogenous and is characterized by the following transition
matrix:  pie,e pie,u
piu,e piu,u

where pij,j′ is the probability of transition from state j and to state j
′ (for j = e, u and
j′ = e, u). One obviously has pij,e + pij,u = 1, with j = e, u. The process describing the
evolution of the health status will be described latter.
The instantaneous utility function of an individual agent includes two additive terms.
The ﬁrst term is the standard CRRA utility function depending on the individual con-
sumption level. The second term corresponds to an additional utility of being in good
health. One has:
u(c) =
c1−µ − 1
1− µ + 1(h = g)× u (1)
where µ is the risk aversion coeﬃcient and u denotes the additional amount of utility of
being in good health. Finally, 1() is an indicator function satisfying 1(h = g) = 1.
We now describe the budget constraint. At each period, an agent receives an income
y(j) depending on his job status. One has y(e) = (1 − τ)w and y(u) = b, with w the
wage rate and b the unemployment beneﬁt. The working time of an employed agent is
normalized to 1, in other words, labor supply is inelastic. τ denotes the tax rate or payroll
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tax ﬁnancing the unemployment insurance.
An agent will take the following decisions. He must choose his consumption c and his
asset level a′, and he must decide whether or not to do a ﬁxed health spending d. This is
a discrete choice, the decision variable is denoted by m. The variable m takes the value
of 1 if the agent invests in health and 0 if he chooses to do nothing. If the agent is in bad
health, the health investment will increase the probability of transition to good health.
We will discuss this point latter.
Capital is accumulated by the households. One unit of capital is rented by the
representative ﬁrm at the rate R. Furthermore, capital depreciates at rate δ. We denote
by a the present wealth of the agent and by a′ his wealth next period. The state variables
characterizing the present situation of the agent are (a, j, h).
The budget constraint of a state (a, j, h) agent writes:
a′ = y(j) + (1 +R− δ)a− c− 1(m = 1)× d
We also assume that agents face a liquidity constraint in such a way that a′ ≥ 0.
The problem of an individual agent at state (a, j, h) can be written recursively. The
agent has to choose its consumption level c(a, j, h), its asset level a′(a, j, h) and to take its
care decision m(a, j, h). Given the prices w and R, the household decisions are solution
of the following Bellman equation:
V (a, j, h) = max
a′,c,m
{
c1−µ − 1
1− µ + 1(h = g)u+ β
∑
j′
∑
h′
pij,j′pi
m
h,h′V (a
′, j′, h′)
}
(2) −a′ + y(j) + (1 +R− δ)a− c− 1(m = 1)d ≥ 0a′ ≥ 0
β < 1 is the discount factor.
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Representative ﬁrm. Let denote by K the aggregate capital and N the aggregate em-
ployment. There is a representative ﬁrm producing a single good, using a constant return-
to-scale technology represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = F (K,N) =
AKαN1−α, with A > 0 and α ∈]0, 1[. Assume that markets are perfectly competitive, the
ﬁrm is price-taker and chooses the amount of factors that maximizes its proﬁts. One has
the following optimality conditions:
∂F (K,N)
∂K
= αAKα−1N1−α = R (3)
∂F (K,N)
∂N
= (1− α)AKαN−α = w (4)
Stationary equilibrium. We only focus on the stationary equilibrium. We suppose
the replacement rate ρ is given and the payroll tax τ is adjusted each period in order
to balance the insurance fund. N denotes the aggregate employment and U = 1 − N
is the number of unemployed workers. It is easy to show that the stationary level of
employment is N = 1−piu,u
1−pie,e+1−piu,u . With ρ the replacement rate, one has b = ρw. For a
given replacement rate, the payroll tax τ adjusts to ensure the balance of the insurance
system, that is τwN = b(1−N) which reduces to:
τ = ρ
1−N
N
(5)
As we previously underlined, agents may decide to do or not the health spending d.
The superscripts 1 and 0 respectively point out agents doing and not doing the health
spending. One has:
N = N1 +N0 U = U1 + U0
Solving the household program (2), one gets the policy rules c = c(a, j, h), a′ = a′(a, j, h)
andm = m(a, j, h). Using these policy rules, it is possible to compute the density function
λ(a, j, h) giving the number of agents at state (a, j, h). We thus suppose the state variable
a takes its value in a grid A =
{
0, a1, ..., an
}
. Therefore, λ(a, j, h) is given by the following
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expression:
λ(a′, j′, h′) =
∑
j∈{e,u}
∑
h∈{g,b}
∑
a∈{a|a′=a′(a,j,h)}
pij,j′
 pi1h,h′1[1 = m(a, j, h)]+ pi0h,h′(1− 1[1 = m(a, j, h)])
λ(a, j, h)
Aggregate variables. Using this density function λ(a, j, h), we can deﬁne the economic
aggregates:
K =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)ada C =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)c(a, j, h)da
D =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)1(m = 1)dda
which are respectively the capital, the consumption and the medical expenditures. We
can also deﬁne the population aggregates:
N =
∑
h
∫
λ(a, e, h)ada U =
∑
h
∫
λ(a, u, h)ada
N1 =
∑
h
∫
1[1 = m(a, e, h)]λ(a, e, h)ada N0 =
∑
h
∫
(1− 1[1 = m(a, e, h)])λ(a, e, h)ada
U1 =
∑
h
∫
1[1 = m(a, u, h)]λ(a, u, h)ada U0 =
∑
h
∫
(1− 1[1 = m(a, u, h)])λ(a, u, h)ada
which are respectively the number of employees, of unemployed workers, of employees in
good health or in bad health, of unemployed workers in good health or in bad health.
The aggregation of the individual budget constraints gives:
K ′ = (1− τ)wN + bU + (1 +R− δ)K − (N1 + U1)d− C
Using the balanced budget constraint of the insurance fund and the ﬁrm's optimality
conditions, one gets:
K ′ = (1− δ)K + Y − (N1 + U1)d− C
3 CALIBRATION AND RESULTS 9
Numerical algorithm. The model is solved using standard numerical methods. The
solution method is based on the discretization of the state space variables. To begin, we
guess a level aggregate capital K0. Given the exogenous level of employment N , we use
equations (3), (4) and (5) to deduce the rental rate of capital R, the wage rate w and
the unemployment beneﬁt b, and thus the income process y(j). This allows to solve the
household program and thus to ﬁnd the decision rules.4 We use them to update the value
of the aggregate capital K1. The process is continued until convergence.
3 Calibration and results
The model is calibrated to match a set of ﬁrst order moments estimated using his-
torical data. Using this calibration, we propose to measure the contributions of both
health and labor market speciﬁcities in the explanation on the contrasting equilibria that
summarizes the French and the US data.
3.1 Calibration strategy
The vector of the model's parameter is Φ = {Φ1,Φ2} with dim(Φ) = 21. All param-
eters calibrated using external information are:
Φ1 =
{
β, µ, δ, α, {pije,u, piju,e, ρj}j=US,FR
}
dim(Φ1) = 10
The discount factor β is calibrated to match a monthly discount factor consistent with
an annual interest rate of 4%. We set µ that governs the relative risk aversion equals to
2. The depreciation rate of capital (δ) is set such that 8% per year of the used capital
is depreciated. The parameter of the Cobb Douglas production function is equal to 0.3.
The worker ﬂows {pijeu, pijue}j=US,FR are provided by Shimer (2012)[15] for the US and by
4The household program is solved using value function iterations. Value function iteration algorithm
applies the contraction mapping theorem. The algorithm is guaranteed to converge by this theorem and
it stops when the gap between the value functions of two successive iterations becomes negligible. See
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)[12] for more details on this method.
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Le Barbanchon, Hairault and Sopraseuth (2015)[10] for France. These worker ﬂows lead
to a unemployment rate equal to 7.22% in the US and 10.26% in France. Finally, we
estimate the replacement rates {ρj}j=US,FR as the gross unemployment replacement rate
in OECD database and follow the results reported by CESifo Groupe (Unemployment
Beneﬁt Replacement Rates,1961-2011, 2012).
β µ δ α pie,u piu,e ρ
France
0.9975 2 8% 0.3
0.016 0.14 0.32
US 0.035 0.45 0.15
Table 1: Parameters for France and the US
For the other parameters, we need some restrictions in order to identify them using
a set of moments computed using French and US data. We take as a reference the GDP
of the US economy, and thus normalize Y US to unity (this implies a restriction for AUS).
Hence, 11 parameters are calibrated:
Φ2 =
{
AFR,
{
u¯j, dj, pijg,g, pi
j,1
b,b , pi
j,0
b,b
}
j=US,FR
}
dim(Φ2) = 11
The calibrated parameters are the solution to minΦ2 ||Ψtheo(Φ2)−Ψ||, where the numerical
solution for Ψtheo(·) is provided by the algorithm based on value function iterations and
general equilibrium convergence. The 11 free parameters are the elements of Φ2, whereas
the 11 ﬁrst-order moments provided by the data are:
Ψ =
{
Y FR
Y US
,
{
M j
Y j
, pj(H = 0),
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) ,
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) ,
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1)
}
j=US,FR
}
with dim(Ψ) = 11.
3.2 Results
The solution for the calibrated parameters are reported in table 2.
What do we learn on country-speciﬁc health market? First of all, good health
is more valuated in France than in the US. This result is in accordance with the less
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risky behaviors of the French people, in particular in terms of obesity. This is already
underlined by Fonseca, Langot, Michaud and Sopraseuth (2018)[6]. Concerning the ef-
ﬁciency of the health sector, the transition matrices provide the probability gaps to be
cured conditionally to spend money in health. If the agent don't buy health services, the
risks are characterized by piFRg,g > pi
US
g,g and pi
FR,0
b,b < pi
US,0
b,b . This suggests that for agents
who are already in good health, it's better for them to be in France than in the US, but
if they are in bad health the probability to cure is lower in France. In average, without
health expenditures, the probabilities to be in good health are 58.46% and 48.72% re-
spectively in France and in the US. If the agent spend money in health services, we have
piFR,1b,b > pi
US,1
b,b , showing that the probability to cure is higher in the US. This suggests
that the eﬃciency of the health sector is higher in the US than in France. Nevertheless,
this eﬃciency gap is very small: for these agents spending money in health services, the
expectations to be in good health are 80% and 79.44% respectively in France and in the
US. Our results also show that the costs of health services are larger in the US than in
France: we have dUS > dFR. This is consistent with previous study of Fonseca, Langot,
Michaud and Sopraseuth (2018)[6]. Last but not least, we calibrate A in order to have
the ratio between US salary and French salary at about 1.44, which is close enough to the
real ratio 1.46 in OECD database.
A u¯ d pig,g pi
1
b,b pi
0
b,b
France 0.0803 2.295 0.01482 0.801 0.19 0.72
US 0.104 2.1 0.0347 0.78 0.15 0.791
Table 2: Calibrated parameters for France and the US
The model's ﬁt. The ﬁt of the model is reported in the table 3. We ﬁnd that almost all
moments we pick match the data, all except one (the percentage of healthy agents in the
third revenue quartile versus the ones in the ﬁrst revenue quartile), but it's because the
discrete nature of the decision that agents make. In a discrete choice model, there exists a
wealth threshold for each type of agent (employed and unemployed workers) above which
the optimal decision is to consume health services because they are in bad health. Given
that this expenditure in health services is a ﬁx cost, all the agents above the threshold
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have access to the same health services and thus have the same chance to become healthy
agents. Hence, in the model, the population is divided into 2 groups: those who have a
low health risk and those who have a high health risk.5 At the equilibrium, there are 2
France US
model data model data
Y FR/Y US 0.6769 0.666 1 1
M j/Y j 9.82% 10% 14.59% 14.6%
pj(H = 0) 26.48% 28% 30.6 % 30%
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.1012 1.06 1.1728 1.196
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.2673 1.17 1.4631 1.337
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.2688 1.245 1.4741 1.475
Table 3: Simulation results for France and the US
groups of agents in these economies: those we have access to the health services, and those
who have not. Hence, the model generates two health groups. The ﬁrst one has a low risk
to be in bad health and in this case the probability to cure is high. Hence, whether these
agents are in good or bad heath, with a job or not, are mainly characterized by a amount
of assets larger than the threshold above which they pay the access to the health services.
This feature of the equilibrium distribution also explains why the percentage of healthy
agents in the third revenue quartile does not match the data: in the top two revenue
quartiles, all agents are rich enough to choose to invest in health. Thus the percentage of
healthy agents in the third revenue quartile is rather close to the one in the last revenue
quartile but relatively far from the data showing that our two-states model is too simple
to account for this heterogeneity.
4 Counterfactual experiments
Given these characteristics of the benchmark equilibria, we can now proceed to coun-
terfactual simulations in order to evaluate the relative contributions of each country-
speciﬁc calibration. In a ﬁrst section, we focus on the impact of cross-country diﬀerences
on the labor market. In a second section, we compare the impact of these labor market
5See the appendix A for more detailed statistics on the health gradient.
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gaps to the cross-country diﬀerences observed on the health services market.
4.1 The impact of the cross-country diﬀerences on the labor mar-
ket
Starting from the US case (case (0)), we propose two diﬀerent scenarios:
(1) The employment risk (the transition matrix Πe) is the same as in France
(2) The replacement rate ρ is the same as the replacement rate in France
The results are in the table 4.
(1) (2) (0)
Scenario ΠFRe ρ
FR US
bench.
p(H = 1) 75.5 % 77.5% 69.1 %
p(m = 1) 86.55% 92.96% 64.26%
r 0.2296% 0.2474% 0.2459%
Welfare∗ -3.65% 0.42% 0
Cons. losses 3.79% -0.4% 
∗ Variations of the welfare relative to the benchmark:
((Welfare(0)-Welfare(x))/Welfare(0))×100
Table 4: US with French-style labor market
There are two risks in the economy. The ﬁrst is the job loss leading to low labor
incomes and the second is the bad health leading to low welfare. Larger income risks
lead the households to save more in order to smooth their consumption. At general
equilibrium, this precautionary saving can reduce the interest rate. But it is not always
the case because the low employment rate reduces the marginal return of the capital.
Obviously these income risks (governed by the matrix Πe) can also be reduced by the
unemployment beneﬁts (ρ). If France is characterized by an higher unemployment risk,
this country is also more generous than the US for the unemployed workers.
Income risks (1). If the French labor market risks are "exported" in the US (column
(1)), there will be more precautionary saving in the US: the US workers must insure
4 COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS 14
themselves against a higher unemployment risk. Hence, there is more capital supply in
the economy. But, at the same time, the level of employment declines (the unemployment
rate is multiplied by two), leading to a decline in the demand of capital. This last eﬀect
dominates: the interest rate increases and the aggregate production declines. Hence, the
higher unemployment risk is not overcompensated by the increase of the precautionary
saving of the household. There is less wealth in average in this economy than in the
benchmark calibration of the US economy. The surprising result comes from the share
of individuals in good health: it increases. This is explained by the longer employment
spells when the labor market transitions of the French economy replace those of the
US economy. In this counterfactual experiment, these long employment spells allow the
individuals to reach the wealth threshold from which the agents choose to buy health
services. But, this rise of the proportion of agent in good health cannot compensate the
losses in consumption induced by the decline in production induced by the employment
loses: the welfare is reduced with respect to the benchmark. This welfare loss corresponds
to a consumption reduction of 3.79% each year.
Unemployment beneﬁts (2). An increase of the unemployment beneﬁts reduces the
incentives to save and thus the capital amount in the economy because the unemployment
risk being more generously insured by inter-agent transfers. This increases the interest
rate because the capital demand is not aﬀected by the change in unemployment beneﬁts.
This lower level in capital can reduce the welfare. But, this is not the case because
the consumption of health services increases. Indeed, less saving is needed to insurance
labor market risks, then more resources are available for health expenditures. This is the
case and thus more agents are in good health because a larger part of them choose to
buy health services. Thus, the average welfare increases: in this case the "consumption
losses" are "gains" of 0.4% each year.
What do we learn? These experiments reveal a surprising result: a more rigid la-
bor market help workers, employed and unemployed, to be healthy. Nevertheless, the
employment losses induced by labor market rigidities overcompensate this positive eﬀect
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on health and thus reduce the welfare. In the experiment where the rise in the replace-
ment rate leads to a welfare improvement, we reach the limits of our model. Indeed,
this result can be discussed because a large number of studies underline that when the
replacement rate increases, then the employment rate is reducing. If we take into account
this employment elasticity to the replacement rate, we then obtain a welfare reduction.
4.2 The impact of the cross-country diﬀerences on the health
services market
If a French-style labor market does not seem to be the good way to improve both the
health and the welfare, perhaps that a French-style health services market can reach this
goal. To test this idea, we propose four diﬀerent scenarios:
(3) The cost of health investment d in the US is the same as the cost in France
(4) The beneﬁt of being healthy u¯ in the US is the same as the beneﬁt in France
(5) The health risk (the transition matrix ΠH) in the US is the same as in France
(6) The health risk ΠH , the d and the u¯ in the US are all the same as in France
The results are in the table 5.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (0)
Scenario dFR u¯FR ΠFRH d
FR & US
u¯FR & ΠFRH bench.
p(H = 1) 79.44% 79.27% 60.12% 80.28% 69.1 %
p(m = 1) 99.99% 99.36% 6.84 % 99.98% 64.26%
r 0.2395% 0.2458% 0.2449% 0.2373% 0.2459%
Welfare∗ 4.48% 2.92% 2.20% 7.22% 0
Cons. losses -4.3% -2.9% -2.15% -6.8% 
∗ Variations of the welfare relative to the benchmark:
((Welfare(0)-Welfare(x))/Welfare(0))×100
Table 5: US with French-style health services market
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Cost of the health services (3). The decrease of d leads a larger set of agents to
invest in health: the risk to be in bad health declines. Numerical results show that the
percentage of healthy agents rise up to the limit. At the same time, more resources are
available to insure agents against the unemployment risk. Hence, there is more capital in
the economy and thus more production. This allows household to reach a higher welfare.
Welfare beneﬁts induced by good health status (4). In a society where the good
health is more valued (the risky behaviors as obesity more penalized), the incentives to buy
health services increase. Hence, more agents spend in health services and as a result more
people are in good health. The counterpart of these choices is a reduction of the saving
leading to a rise in the interest rate. The impact on the welfare is a priori undetermined:
the direct impact of the rise value of the good health can be compensated by the decline
in the aggregate capital. Numerical results show that the former eﬀect dominates.
Eﬃciency of the health sector (5). When the French matrix of the health risks is
implemented in the US economy, the average chance to be in bad health declines. This
largely reduces the incentive to spend money in health services (only 6.84% of people buy
health services). Given the high costs of the health services, agents prefer to play with
the "health lottery" where the medical sector do not take part. Hence, more resources
can be devoted to the saving (the insurance of the income risks) leading the capital stock
to increase (the interest rate declines). At the end, the agents welfare is improved
Cost, welfare beneﬁts and eﬃciency of the health sector (6). This last scenario
shows that even if the risk to be in bad health is reduced to value for the French economy, a
lower cost of the health services is crucial to provide incentives to spend in health services.
Moreover, the larger utility value of the good health status magniﬁes this incentive. Hence,
the combination of these three changes in the US economy would allow American people
to have a higher welfare than the French citizens.
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5 Conclusion
This paper shows how a general equilibrium model of Aiyagari (1994)[1] augmented
by health care choices in the spirit of the Grossman (1972)[9] can match the US and
France diﬀerences, namely the facts that the US the health expenditures are larger than
in France but the percentage of individuals in good health is smaller. Using counter-
factual experiments, it is shown that the risks associated to the labor market interact
with the health status of the individuals. We show that the large turnover observed in
the US induces low investment in health, even if these turnovers are associated to short
periods of unemployment (low unemployment risk). Indeed, what matters for the health
decision seems to be the stability of the jobs. These costs in term of health linked to
turnover are partially compensated by the higher employment level allowing to reach a
higher production level at the general equilibrium. We also show that an increase of
the unemployment beneﬁts can improve signiﬁcantly the health of the American but not
their welfare. Therefore, a French-style labor market can not improve simultaneously the
health and the welfare of the Americans. At the opposite, a French-style health services
market can improve both the health and the welfare of the American. Indeed, larger costs
of health services as well as higher risky behavior in the US are the main channels that
explain these results. More precisely, the welfare gain induced by the a reduction of price
of health service in the US such that it would be equal to the French one, is equivalent
to a permanent increase in consumption of 4.3%. A reduction of the risky behaviors with
respect to health, such that they would be equal to the French ones, will induce a rise by
2.9% permanent increase in consumption.
In future researches, more detailed risks on the labor market must be introduced. It
will be also necessary to to distinguish between health care expenditures that have direct
impact on the life expectancy and those that necessary during periods of dependency.
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A The Health Gradient
France US
model data model data
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 63.34% 65 % 54.31% 55.95%
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2) 69.59% 68.9 % 63.69% 66.9 %
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3) 80.28% 76.05 % 79.46% 74.8 %
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4) 80.45% 80.925% 80.06% 82.5 %
Table 6: Percentage of agents in good health by income quartiles - France and US
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